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Rapid technological and economic change is extending the availability of modern 
technologies around the world, and fuelling aspirations to use them. Their portability 
means technologies ‘released’ in one context are soon felt in others. This means, 
first, the variety of dynamic social and environmental user contexts increases; 
second the performance and effects of the technologies becomes more uncertain; 
and third, sources of production and modes of access proliferate.
Such dynamics pose significant challenges for policy-makers attempting to govern 
technology. Regulations remain important instruments of (technology) governance 
(Braithwaite et al 2007). Technologies are subject to multiple procedures for setting 
norms and standards in relation to quality, safety, effectiveness, intellectual property, 
environmental protection and so on. Indeed, in fields like agricultural biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals, the formulation of regulatory assurances is an important 
aspect of the technology development process. Regulatory and technological 
pathways co-evolve. 
The international harmonisation of regulations often facilitates particular forms of 
technology governance, and in doing so encourages technological diffusion and 
serves to reinforce particular socio-technical pathways, whilst obstructing others. 
Harmonising assumptions are reproduced through capacity building initiatives and 
regulatory frameworks transposed across countries (including into developing 
countries with weaker regulatory institutions). Developing countries often have little 
choice but to comply with regulations set by international institutions if they wish to 
trade. There are intense pressures to standardize and harmonize globally.
The STEPS Rethinking Regulation project is examining the harmonising regulation 
of two widely available technologies - transgenic cotton seeds and antibiotics - in 
China and Argentina. We wish to explore how their regulation - in terms of property/
access and quality/risk - overlaps, compares and contrasts with the way poorer users 
experience these properties. How, for example, do regulators’ understandings of 
the efficacious and safe use of antibiotics compare with poorer users’ experiences? 
What issues are being raised through the actual use of these artefacts, and that the 
regulatory view does not reach? Where regulatory reach is absent, what strategies 
do the users themselves deploy in order to assure themselves of technological 
benefits and guard against risks? In sum, how inclusive are the regulatory framings 




We will use the findings from these case studies to explore the implementation 
challenges facing regulators, and to explore the potential for more reflexive 
regulatory capacities that can appreciate technology issues and performance 
priorities as experienced and valued by poorer communities, and that can reflect 
upon the role of regulation in signposting pathways to Sustainability.
As the initial step in this project, this working paper provides a brief description 
of the project’s objectives and, more substantively, a discussion of two relevant 
bodies of literature. The first of these concerns empirical accounts of the regulation 
of pharmaceutical drugs and transgenic seeds in a globalising context. We are 
interested in what is known about how international regulatory harmonisation 
processes influence the development of national regulations in the medicines and 
transgenic seed sectors, and how, once refracted through national institutions, 
those regulations impact on seed/drug technology access and use. The second 
body of literature concerns empirical discussion of the informal reality of drug and 
seed use in developing country settings. Here we are interested in the ways in 
which actual patterns of technology use amongst poorer communities have been 
documented, and in particular how they might differ from the assumptions and 
expectations of policymakers, regulators and other actors about appropriate 
technological practices. Several additional bodies of literature, especially analytical 
literatures, are relevant to our project too, but out purpose in this document is not 
to explore how various analytical approaches might be useful for our endeavour; 
rather we wish to discuss what we know empirically about globalising drug and 
seed regulation and drug and seed use in developing countries. We do, however, 
end with a summary interpretation of this literature by reference to the core STEPS 
Centre themes of scales, dynamics, framings, and pathways.
2. THE RETHINKING REGULATION PROJECT
Regulation remains a key device available to states interested in shaping 
technology for socially desired purposes. The ways in which technology is 
regulated have important implications for, inter alia, investment decisions, 
innovation processes, whether particular kinds of artefacts are produced at all, 
the forms in which particular artefacts are made available, how and to whom 
access is provided, and the type, levels and distribution, of benefits, costs and 
risks that they pose to different actors. Yet regulation is never determined solely by 
nation state concerns. Multiple, incommensurable understandings  - or ‘framings’ 
- of regulatory issues and problems exist amongst different stakeholders, for 
example assuring access to export markets, or protecting the intellectual property 
of inward investors, or responding to local safety concerns, and these interact 
across scales - as international agreements between states, the political economy 
of globalising production processes and local campaigns for greater protection 
attest. State regulation can become susceptible to capture by powerful interests. 
It may lack sufficient capacity for effective implementation, become insensitive to 
circumstances on the ground, or simply fail to keep up with events. Regulators 
struggle to bring technological practices into line with their mandates. Despite this, 
regulations continue to provide influential signals about the (contested) direction of 
technology development, which is why states, businesses and citizens continually 
engage in their negotiation.
Regulatory harmonisation processes and associated capacity building efforts, 
whether multilateral, bilateral or domestic, often presume stable and certain worlds 
and widely shared goals. They contain explicit and implicit assumptions about the 
contexts of technology use that may not apply across all localities. This raises 
questions about the responsiveness and adaptability of regulations to local needs 
and the issues of particular groups, especially poorer communities. Regulatory 
harmonisation may seek to bring those localities into line, but there can be aspects 
to the local context that are beyond the reach of these regulatory attempts and that 
constantly undermine unreflexive attempts at harmonisation.
In practice, regulators struggle with diverse and dynamic ecological and user 
contexts. Disease ecologies, markets and social and demographic change, for 
example, interact in ways that vary across regions and localities producing multiple 
patterns, multiple needs, and shifting uncertainties. Regulators also need to 
arbitrate between a diverse variety of international, national and local industrial 
policy and social framings of what exactly the ‘regulatory’ problems are. Some of 
these framings will be readily apparent, perhaps articulated by powerful actors and 
institutions, whilst others may be far less visible. Regulations inevitably privilege 
some classes of technology producer/user over others, whether deliberately 
or through insufficiently reflexive framings of the issues and problems that 
regulations are designed to address. Yet dominant discourses around regulatory 
harmonisation frequently cast such highly political issues in the narrow light of 
technical considerations of regulatory design (Francis 1993). 
With these issues in mind, the Rethinking Regulation project poses the 
following questions:
u How do regulators understand the world they are regulating; how do they try 
to bring actual technological practices and their consequences into line with their 
regulatory framings?
u How and why do these regulatory worlds contrast with the ways technologies 
are experienced amongst poorer users; how do poorer users develop informal 
strategies for assuring themselves of benefits and guarding against risks?
u How far do regulatory reforms and capacity building efforts bridge these divergent 
socio-technical worlds; which initiatives improve the reach of regulation for the poor 
in diverse and uncertain contexts?
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This project will thus trace the relationships between global and local forms of 
governance and regulation, asking how, for specific issues and settings, global 
and national regulatory regimes actually work, or fail to work, in practice. We will 
explore the interactions between formal regulation and informal practices that may 
emerge to fill the vacuum (or resist unwelcome regulatory intrusions upon existing 
practices), whether based on citizen action and social networks, everyday means 
of getting-by, or semi-legal activities. Exploring who gains and who loses from 
these interactions, this project will work towards identifying alternative regulatory 
pathways that work for Sustainability.
PROJECT CASE STUDIES AND LOCATIONS
Our chosen case study artefacts are antibiotic medicines and transgenic 
cotton seeds. Other artefacts could have been chosen but the two case study 
technologies satisfy some general criteria: both are in global circulation and are 
used by poorer people in both project locations. They represent two of the three 
domains - health, agriculture, and water – that the STEPS Centre is focusing on. 
Antibiotic medicines and transgenic cotton seeds are important technologies with 
the potential to significantly impact on poverty alleviation and sustainability in 
various ways. They are also subject to significant controversy around regulation 
and use. Antibiotics and transgenic cotton seeds are both associated with 
regulatory pressures at a global level that frame the room for manoeuvre of 
national regulators, who have also to confront domestic political issues. Such multi-
level regulatory combinations generate different opportunities and concerns in 
different locations.  
In the area of pharmaceuticals, a geographically concentrated and oligarchic 
industrial structure has co-evolved with public regulatory frameworks over a 
long period. This situation is increasingly unsettled, however, by new producers 
in new locations, and by new markets which by-pass controlled, but sometimes 
limited, public health provision. Established regulatory purposes and processes 
are challenged and re-opened by these new issues. For example, public health 
services may experience capacity pressures at a time of growing demand, creating 
space for alternative providers to respond through less regulated private markets. 
Alongside these informal markets, intellectual property regulation can support 
high prices for protected drugs. When combined with poorly implemented controls 
on trade, manufacture, or distribution, this opens space for (highly tradable) 
counterfeit products. This mixed picture of different regulatory logics, enforced to 
varying degrees at different points in the system, raises concerns about the safety 
of individual users and, in the case of drugs such as antibiotics, avoiding patterns 
of use that risk microbial resistance at the societal level. 
Transgenic seed regulation is in a different situation to the extent that similar 
globalising processes are evident, but without a prior, stable regulatory regime 
already in place. Instead, a global regulatory regime that enables multinational 
seed businesses to operate in multiple markets is contested, and remains seriously 
challenged in certain key markets. National regulators are forced to arbitrate between 
international obligations to harmonise seed regulation and their own priorities 
on the appropriate development, diffusion and use of transgenic technologies 
within their agricultural sectors. But this regulatory activity also confronts a highly 
heterogeneous set of realities and concerns on the ground, raising questions about 
whose framings of the ‘public interest’ are informing regulation.
Argentina and China provide testing locations for contrasting harmonising seed and 
drug regulation with users’ experiences of those artefacts. We have chosen those 
two jurisdictions for a variety of reasons: both are relatively powerful developing 
countries with their own seed and drug business capabilities and associated state 
interests, and have relatively large domestic markets. However, depending upon 
the technology in question, they contrast in terms of continued levels of public 
sector provision, export-orientation, and public regulatory architectures. Both have 
a variety of distribution channels, some of them open to poorer users, but to different 
degrees. And, as in other jurisdictions, both have been under pressure to reform their 
regulations in one or both of the case study areas. China is an increasingly important 
player in global regulations, and rapidly changing institutional and socio-technical 
contexts bring further challenges to the implementation of harmonised regulations. 
Neither Argentina nor especially China are typical of developing countries, but the 
objective of our research is not to generalise away from those case studies, nor to 
draw a direct comparison between these two locations (many others could have 
been chosen) but rather to use them as test-beds for developing a methodology that 
explores the ways regulatory systems understand and intervene in socio-technical 
practices, and to build upon that knowledge by considering programmes for 
regulatory capacity-building that are more inclusive towards poorer communities. 
3. DEFINING ‘TECHNOLOGY REGULATION’
Before turning to the literature on seed and drug regulation and use, it is useful 
to consider how we have defined ‘technology regulation’ for the purposes of this 
project. The term regulation is used in very different ways by different authors 
and it has different meanings in different jurisdictions. Thus far, our own working 
definition of technology regulation has been: ‘attempts by states to shape the 
broad governance and specific uses of technology’. Note that this definition, whilst 
state-centred, is explicitly open to the incorporation of non-state actors. Such 
actors do not simply use technologies, but are part of its broader governance. 
u How does the global political economy of technology development, coupled 
with unequal access to regulatory negotiations, shape the space for regulatory 
alternatives at different scales?
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Indeed regulators are reliant upon others to make regulations effective, in terms of 
creating desired technological practices and ensuring they are followed. Non-state 
actors’ activities include, for example, the work of international organisations, self-
regulation in business, informal regulatory initiatives in the absence of effective 
states, and hybrid forms of social co-ordination. 
Our working definition also reflects the fact that regulation is not solely about 
controls on established technology products and processes - a quite common 
definition of technology regulation - but extends, more broadly, to a desire to 
regulate the development of new technologies. Our definition of regulation thus 
includes deliberate ‘front-end’ attempts by regulators to support and direct ongoing 
technology innovation. 1However, in extending our working definition to include 
front-end technology policy we are keen not to just redefine regulation as all 
governmental or governance activities. Here it may be useful to bear in mind the 
distinction made by Braithwaite et al:
Likewise, distribution and provision can also embody regulation. Innovation 
policies, for example, may be understood in part as ‘distributing’ (e.g. subsidising 
private R&D) or ‘providing’ activities (for instance through direct public R&D and 
the training of scientists and engineers); but they are nevertheless also regulating 
activities, to the extent that they might be designed to encourage public and private 
actors to create, modify, and diffuse certain kinds of technologies in relation to a 
broader set of policy objectives and ambitions. 
It is useful briefly to contrast our working definition with the main kinds of working 
definitions - of regulation in general - that exist in the broader regulation literature. 
There are unsurprisingly an extremely heterogeneous set of definitions in use 
but, as Julia Black (2002) has noted, most are of three types. The first, and most 
narrow, is the setting of rules by government, usually accompanied by mechanisms 
for monitoring and enforcement. This is perhaps the core understanding that many 
have of regulation, but it is narrower than our version. It confines regulation to 
the setting and enforcement of rules, rather than encompassing other means by 
which behaviour of individuals and institutions may deliberately be influenced. It 
also leaves no room for non-state actors. A second, broader, but also common 
definition of regulation is any form of direct state intervention in the economy. This 
too leaves no room for non-state actors but, in relation to state-centred activities, 
Governments and governance are about providing, distributing, and regulating. 
Regulation can be conceived as that large subset of governance that is about 
steering the flow of events and behavior, as opposed to providing and distributing. Of 
course, when regulators regulate, they often steer the providing and distributing that 
regulated actors undertake as well (Braithwaite et al 2007, p. 3).
it is also broader than our working definition, and would include what Braithwaite 
et al call the ‘distributing’ and ‘providing’ functions of the state. A third, extremely 
broad, but not uncommon definition of regulation is all mechanisms of social control 
or influence affecting all aspects of behaviour from whatever source, whether they 
are intentional or not. This definition, whilst allowing space for non-state actors, 
provides no boundary as to where regulation might end. It encompasses every 
kind of state/market/cultural influence on behaviour. For the moment, we note that 
our own working definition of regulation is state-centred, but nevertheless seeks to 
open up regulation to include non-state actors and activities. It also encompasses 
a wider range of activities than just rule setting, but nevertheless maintains a focus 
on the purposeful steering of behaviour. 
The vast, long-standing literature on regulation is dedicated to understanding the 
mechanisms by which governments establish rules; studying responses amongst 
the regulated; debating the most efficient ways of reforming regulations; and 
the processes by which the public interest is identified and regulatory objectives 
subsequently understood. John Francis makes the important point that much in 
regulation is ambiguous since regulations rarely prohibit an activity outright, but 
rather constrain the way that activity is performed; and, of course, defining the 
‘public interest’ is a highly political activity involving negotiations within the state 
and between the state and other actors (Francis 1993). However, in all this, much 
of the regulation literature sees divergence between formal regulatory mandates 
and informal realities as problematic and something to be overcome through better 
regulatory design and further capacity-building. 
We will be drawing on some of the analytical themes in this regulation literature 
in our project. One body of work, on decentred understandings of regulation, in 
particular, may prove fruitful in Rethinking Regulation. Decentred understandings 
of regulation recognise that regulation is not centred on the state, but instead is 
diffused throughout society. It is concerned with how actors other than the state 
are, and might be, harnessed in the design of hybrid mechanisms in order to further 
public policy objectives. Amongst other things, it takes seriously the complexity of 
interactions between actors in society, the fragmentation and socially constructed 
nature of knowledge in society, the dispersal of power between social actors and 
between actors and the state, the relative autonomy and ungovernability of actors 
and systems, and the collapse of clear public/private distinctions (Black 2002). 
The decentred literature is used to both describe regulatory experience, and to 
provide prescriptive analyses, both strands of which we might find useful. However 
as emphasised above, our intention in this paper is not to explore which kinds of 
analytical literatures might prove fruitful for our purposes, but rather to discuss 
what we know empirically about drug and seed regulation in a globalising context, 
and about drug and seed use, especially informal patterns of use, in developing 
countries. We now turn to each of these in turn.
1 Relations between regulation and technology also have to be considered dynamically and within 
a systems context, since existing regulatory decisions, even ‘back-end’ regulation at the point of 
end use, feed back to influence the planning decisions of technology developers.
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4. THE REGULATION OF MEDICINES AND TRANSGENIC 
SEEDS IN A GLOBALISING CONTEXT 
Across diverse fields, technological and otherwise, regulatory solutions that 
were shaped in North America and Europe are increasingly internationalized and 
projected globally. As Levi-Faur (2005, p.13) puts it: “…the reality is that many 
supposedly sovereign polities are increasingly rule takers rather than rule makers 
…” We are interested in how international regulatory harmonisation processes 
enable, constrain, or otherwise influence the development of national regulations, 
and through these, technology access and use in the drug and transgenic seed 
sectors. This section is therefore a brief description of the main areas of regulation 
that are intended to control the use of drugs and transgenic seeds and that are 
subject to globalizing pressures, and a brief discussion of some of the policy issues 
in relation to developing countries that regulatory harmonisation raises. 
A variety of forces are driving the adoption of harmonised forms of technology 
regulation in developing countries. One important source of pressure arises 
from developing countries’ participation in global supply chains (Newell 2002). 
Developing countries may have little choice but to comply with the regulatory 
requirements established in places where they wish to export to, or import from. 
Another form of pressure to harmonise standards and regulatory approaches are 
the formal obligations that arise as a result of membership of multilateral trade 
and environmental agreements, covering issues such as intellectual property 
rights and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Bilateral trade and investment 
agreements between developing and developed countries are also an important 
harmonising force. These often oblige developing countries to adopt particular 
forms of regulatory control, or dismantle others, often beyond the minimum required 
by multilateral agreements and obligations. Often associated with multilateral and 
bilateral trade and environment, agreements are a variety of international regulatory 
harmonisation activities and capacity building exercises co-ordinated by institutions 
such as World Bank, OECD, WHO, FAO, and UNDP. These may not necessarily 
seek to harmonise particular regulatory standards, but they often imply common 
regulatory frameworks through, for instance, a common insistence that good 
regulatory principles or best practices are those that do not inhibit international 
trade (OECD 2007).
Regulations intended to control seed and drug use and that are subject to the 
kinds of globalizing pressures mentioned above are discussed below under the 
headings: a) regulation of intellectual property, b) regulation of the technological 
artefact, and c) regulation of the supply chain (i.e. producers, suppliers and users 
of the technological artefact). 
REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Membership of the WTO (Argentina has been a member since 1995 and China 
joined in 2001) involves a significant obligation to put in place particular kinds of 
intellectual property protection. Under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement all developing countries that are members of the 
WTO have had to establish minimum standards of intellectual property protection. 
The TRIPs Agreement, which entered into force in 1994, requires that 20-year 
patents be available for the products and processes of all types of technology, 
regardless of the place of invention, or whether products are imported or locally 
produced. Prior to the signing of the Agreement, the right of different countries to 
implement different systems of intellectual property protection, according to their 
level of economic development, was recognised by the international agreements 
covering patent protection (Coriat et al 2006). Given very limited technological 
capabilities, it was generally in developing countries’ interests not to grant patents, 
so that domestic firms could ‘learn by copying’. Indeed, a common feature of all 
successful cases in the 19th and 20th centuries in those countries which were, 
at that time, less developed countries that later ‘caught up’ with the then leading 
economies is that they operated with intellectual property regimes that did not 
restrict the abilities of domestic firms to copy the technologies used in the most 
advanced countries (Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007).
Most developing countries had a deadline of 2000, and for pharmaceuticals 2005, 
to comply with TRIPs, whilst the least developed countries were given a deadline 
of 2006, later extended to 2013. Under bilateral pressure many developing 
countries complied with TRIPs before those deadlines. There are some important 
exceptions to the general requirement that patents should be available for all types 
of technology, and there are allowances for flexibility, both of which affect the seeds 
and pharmaceutical sectors in different ways.
TRANSGENIC SEEDS
Under Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement, novel plant varieties can be excluded 
from the general requirement that all inventions be patentable. However, if WTO 
members choose to make that exclusion they still have to provide for the protection 
of novel plant varieties using ‘an effective sui generis [of its own kind] system.’ Most 
developing countries have chosen to avoid granting patents to plant varieties as 
a result of TRIPs obligations and have instead relied on existing, or have adopted 
new, sui generis systems. The most widely used of such systems is the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the UPOV Convention). 
It is designed to give plant breeders the right to control the commercial use of their 
new plant varieties, while at the same time allowing other breeders to use the 
new varieties as an initial source of variation in their own work. It was, however, 
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designed with the commercialised farming systems of developed countries 
in mind and was initially ratified by a small number of industrialised countries 
(Tripp et al 2007). 
Two forms of the Convention exist, UPOV 1978 and the stronger UPOV 1991, which 
new UPOV members are now required to join (Tripp et al 2007). Under UPOV 1978, 
breeders’ rights are a copyright-like form of intellectual property which allows the 
variety owner to have a monopoly on the commercial propagation and marketing 
of the variety, but little control over other uses. Farmers are free to multiply seed 
for their own use - including for non-commercial seed exchange among farmers 
- for as long as they wish. Other breeders can also freely use protected varieties 
to develop their own material. Only those plant varieties or species listed by the 
country have to be covered by the Convention.
Under UPOV 1991, breeders’ rights are strengthened at the expense of farmers’
rights. There is still an exception for farm-saved seed but this does not extend to 
informal trade and exchange among farmers. Furthermore, the exception is not 
automatic. Governments have to legislate to allow farm-saved seed to be reused 
by farmers. The plant breeder also has the right to a royalty payment on farmers’ 
use of saved seed. Other breeders are still allowed to use protected varieties to 
develop their own material, but if a new variety is only marginally different from 
an existing one, it does not qualify for plant protection on its own. Finally, all plant 
species and varieties have to be covered by UPOV 1991 (Tripp et al 2007).
The TRIPs Agreement does not require that countries seeking a sui generis system 
sign up to the UPOV Conventions but a large number of developing countries 
have either adopted UPOV-like plant variety protection legislation or have joined 
the UPOV (Tripp et al 2007). Argentina joined UPOV in 1994 and China joined in 
1999, in both cases signing up to the 1978 Convention. In practice, bilateral trade 
and investment agreements with industrialised countries often include provisions 
that require either patents on plants or UPOV membership or both. For example, 
recently concluded free trade agreements between the United States and at least 
eight Latin American countries (although not Argentina) require all parties to join 
UPOV and make “all reasonable efforts” to allow patents on plants. The agreements 
also state that this policy shift must never be reversed (Grain 2007a). 
For many developing countries, the TRIPs requirements imposed a marked change 
in policy since their own needs and conditions had meant that many had a weak 
or non-existent form of IPR for seeds. This is because crop variety development 
and seed production was often dominated by the public sector, and/or operated at 
farmer level, rather than being a commercial business. Where farmers are used to 
using and reproducing varieties that elsewhere are protected, and where domestic 
research capacities are not internationally competitive, strengthened IPRs are 
unlikely to provide much in the way of benefits for either the informal breeding 
sector or the farming communities.
Where a seed industry existed it was usually based on the production of hybrid 
seed (i.e. the first-generation cross of two or more inbred lines) for which IPRs 
are not crucial. This is because the inbred parent lines are secret which prevents 
competitors from producing the same variety. Second generation hybrid seed also 
loses some of its yield potential and uniformity which means that farmers often 
prefer to re-purchase seed. In theory, IPRs may stimulate seed firms to invest in 
R&D, yet what limited evidence exists suggests that strengthened IPRs do not lead 
to increased plant breeding; rather, they allow seed firms to get a better return on 
existing investments, at the expense of farmers (Van Wijk 1996).
One important argument in favour of introducing plant variety protection in developing 
countries is that improved varieties, bred elsewhere, may not be made available to 
domestic seed firms for incorporation into their own breeding programmes unless 
sufficiently strong IPRs exist.  Although strengthened IPR systems may increase 
the flow of protected material from elsewhere, Srinivasan (2003) argues that 
developing countries are likely to find that the terms of access for domestic seed 
companies wishing to get hold of protected plant material are set by a very limited 
number of monopoly suppliers, and that the implications of this for control of plant 
resources and future innovation in plant breeding need to be carefully considered. 
DRUGS
Unlike seeds, pharmaceuticals are not excluded from the general TRIPs requirement 
that all inventions be patentable. Again the TRIPs Agreement represents a 
substantial change for developing countries as many of those countries historically 
had not granted patent protection, or indeed any form of IPR, for pharmaceutical 
products, as the then multilateral agreements permitted. In the absence of 
innovative pharmaceutical firms, it was not in most developing countries’ interests 
to grant pharmaceutical patents to their firms. 
The absence of patent protection for pharmaceutical molecules is also partly 
explained by the fact that social security systems in most developing countries 
could not guarantee the affordability of medicines. Widespread access to treatment 
could therefore only be assured by bringing prices down close to production 
costs, which did not include the additional rent derived from the granting of 
pharmaceutical patent rights. Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, the organization of the 
international pharmaceutical industry was therefore characterized by the existence 
of a dual market: first, a market mainly based on patented products, established in 
developed countries where social transfer systems could assure the affordability 
of highly priced medicines, and second, a market of generic drugs established 
on the grounds of the legal copy of patented medicines (Coriat et al 2006). This 
was implemented in most developing countries either through local production 
or importation. In countries such as Brazil, Argentina, India and China reverse 
engineering of patented medicines enabled local drug manufacturing capacities 
to produce ‘generic’ drugs for the domestic population at low cost. However, as 
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developing countries become TRIPs compliant, (by 2005 all but the least developed 
countries were obliged to be TRIPs compliant) all production of generic copies of 
patented products becomes impossible.
The TRIPs Agreement contains a number of public-health safeguards which enable 
countries to obtain cheaper patented medicines or generic equivalents of patented 
medicines. For example, Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement allows governments 
to temporarily override a patent and authorise production of generic equivalents of 
patented medicines in the public interest (‘compulsory licensing and government 
use’, Oxfam 2006).This was a well established principle prior to the advent of TRIPs 
and had often been (and continues to be) used by developed countries.
Tensions concerning the grounds on which the public-health safeguards in TRIPs 
could be used came to a head in 2001 at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Doha. The Ministerial Conference issued a declaration which reaffirmed the 
exceptions provided for in the TRIPs Agreement. It also acknowledged the need 
to allow developing countries with insufficient or no drug manufacturing capacities 
to import generic versions of patented medicines under compulsory licenses. 
This was because the TRIPs Agreement states that compulsory licensing must 
be predominantly for the domestic market, which meant that developing countries 
without the necessary manufacturing capacity could not rely upon other countries 
to provide medicines (Coriat et al 2006).
As is the case with plant varieties, higher standards of IPR than mandated by 
TRIPs have been agreed with some developing countries as part of bilateral 
free trade agreements between developed and developing countries (so called 
‘TRIPs-plus’ rules). Amongst other things, these typically insist that countries 
expand the scope of pharmaceutical patents to include new therapeutic uses of 
existing medicines (effectively helping to block generic entry), to limit the grounds 
for issuing compulsory licenses to emergencies, government non-commercial use, 
and competition cases, and to prevent parallel trade of patented medicines sold 
more cheaply elsewhere (Médecins sans Frontières 2004).
REGULATION OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARTEFACT
Several types of regulations, for both transgenic seeds and drugs, are aimed 
primarily, or at least partially, at the technological artefact itself.2 In particular, both 
seeds and drugs may be subject to product registration requirements before they 
can be commercially marketed. Most product registration regulations are subject to 
varying degrees of harmonising pressure, as described briefly below.
TRANSGENIC SEED REGISTRATION
In many countries, including China and Argentina, new seed varieties must be 
registered before they can lawfully be marketed. Registration typically requires that 
seed varieties meet established agronomical criteria such as a minimum percentage 
of seed purity and rates of germination, as well as compliance with standards of 
distinctiveness, uniformity and stability. Transgenic seeds often require additional 
regulatory authorisation and there are a number of globalising initiatives that have 
influenced the ways in which developing (and developed) countries design and define 
the registration rules, and more broadly regulatory regimes, for transgenic seeds. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards are regulations covering the protection 
of human health, animal health and plant health. The SPS Agreement states 
that SPS standards that adversely affect international trade, must be “…based 
on scientific principles and…not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence” 
(GATT 2003, para. 6). The existence of a physical risk, supported by scientific 
evidence, is therefore the only legitimate basis upon which the commercialisation 
of traded products and technologies can be restricted or delayed on health or 
environmental grounds. The intention is to discourage members from adopting 
regulatory standards that purport to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
but which function as disguised restrictions on trade. 
Regulatory standards established by certain international institutions (the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics and organizations 
operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention) are 
assumed to meet the obligations established by the SPS Agreement, and members 
are expected to “…base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist…” (Art.3.1) Stricter 
standards than those established by organisations such as the Codex are permitted 
under the Agreement, but in the event of a dispute, members may have to demonstrate to 
a WTO Dispute Panel that they possess a scientific justification for any stricter standard.
The SPS Agreement therefore provides a strong incentive for countries to conform 
to, or at least not to adopt stricter standards than, international measures, 
guidelines and recommendations. If scientific standard-setting were a purely 
scientific, objective process then adopting international standards might not be 
especially problematic. Yet, as many scholars have argued, technical standards, 
as well as the underlying methods for establishing those standards, are inevitably 
premised upon, or framed by, value commitments and social assumptions that are 
not universally valid or accepted. The definition of international standards, or even 
a general approach to setting standards or assessing risks, are activities imbued 
with political and social choices (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
For example, in 2003 the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which oversees the 
development of international food safety standards, published guidelines on foods 
derived from transgenic organisms (Codex 2003). These identify the information 
2 Since technological artefacts embody particular assumptions about the social world in which 
they are produced, distributed and used, rules concerned with the control of those artefacts are 
concerned indirectly with the control of producers, suppliers and users.
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that Codex considers is needed for an effective assessment of risk as well as the 
ways in which such risk assessments should be undertaken. They therefore provide 
a benchmark, as far as the SPS Agreement is concerned, of what constitutes a 
properly scientific approach to assessment of risk for GMOs, and text similar to 
that contained in the guidelines often finds its way into the licensing approaches 
adopted in individual countries.
Those Codex guidelines are not, however, the only conceivable approach to risk 
assessment of GMOs. For example, they help to define the kinds of risks that get 
considered by regulatory assessors and those that are ignored, a decision step that 
is clearly imbued with social preferences. They also help to define the rigour with 
which particular risks will be assessed. On this point, for example, current Codex 
guidelines encourage the use of a concept known as ‘substantial equivalence’ 
which was introduced by the OECD as a means to compare a GM food with a 
conventional counterpart for safety purposes. Codex initially interpreted substantial 
equivalence as requiring a comparison of the chemical composition of a GM food 
with its non GM antecedent. So long as the chemical composition was broadly 
similar the novel foodstuff could be deemed safe. Critics argued, however, that crude 
compositional data provide a very weak screen against the introduction of novel 
genetic, biochemical, immunological or toxicological hazards. The introduction of 
transgenic DNA into an organism may bring about a range of unanticipated changes 
in the expression of other genes, and consequently in the proteins for which the 
genes code. Codex’s interpretation of substantial equivalence effectively assumed 
that a GM product posed no more risks to health than its conventional antecedent. 
It therefore resulted in a relatively permissive approach to regulation, but under the 
guise of a seemingly neutral scientific framework (Millstone et al 2004).
Interestingly, however, interpretations of substantial equivalence have subsequently 
shifted. Under pressure from scientists, some regulatory authorities and NGOs, 
regulatory policy-makers have progressively reinterpreted the concept. It has been 
increasingly common for substantial equivalence no longer to be represented as 
the outcome of a risk assessment but only as a starting point, a way of starting 
to frame a question, not as the basis for an answer. Thus in 2000 a report of the 
FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology noted that 
“…a consideration of compositional changes was not the sole basis for determining 
safety” (Millstone et al 2004). What is interesting about this shift is that it suggests 
that there is scope to challenge and revise scientific standard setting within 
harmonisation processes, but perhaps only on ‘scientific’ grounds even though, 
in practice, the issues are better characterised as hybrid social-scientific issues 
(Levidow et al 2007).
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the Biosafety Protocol) is a multilateral 
agreement that applies to trans-boundary trade in the products of genetic engineering. 
It is concerned primarily with protecting the biodiversity of the flora and fauna of 
the environments into which GM seeds and crops may be introduced, although its 
negotiation was framed around the need to ensure that regulating environmental 
impacts of GMOs was compatible with global trade rules.  The Biosafety Protocol 
works by empowering potential importing countries to exclude GM seeds and 
crops unless and until they have given ‘advanced informed agreement’. Although 
signatory countries to the Biosafety Protocol are authorised to withhold consent, 
they can do so only on condition that their decisions are based on a ‘scientifically 
sound’ risk assessment (Biosafety Protocol, Art. 15 para 1), and one that indicates 
an adverse impact from the GMO in question. As with the SPS Agreement, the 
Biosafety Protocol seeks to minimise the extent to which restrictions on international 
trade are discriminatory or masquerade as environmental protection measures.
The Biosafety Protocol frames the potential adverse impacts of GMOs as largely 
physical in nature. Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol states, however, that 
countries are entitled to take into account “socio-economic considerations arising 
from the impact of [GMOs] on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity” in determining whether to approve the import of a GMO. This is a relatively 
narrow range of socio-economic considerations. It is unlikely, for example, that 
issues such as the distribution of general socio-economic risks and benefits would 
be consistent with Article 26 of the Biosafety Protocol.
The Biosafety Protocol also calls for capacity building to help countries develop 
national biosafety frameworks and to expand their scientific, regulatory and 
administrative capacity. A 2008 review of biosafety and biotechnology training 
programmes claimed that the majority of developing countries are unable to 
manage modern biotechnology and implement national biosafety frameworks. It 
argued that “…the capacity deficiencies are so pervasive and broad that there is no 
effective international system of biosafety at the moment” (Johnston et al 2008).
Under the Biosafety Protocol, the Global Environment Facility (and its hosting 
agencies, the World Bank, the UNDP and UNEP) is mandated to support capacity 
building activities. For example, as part of the process of preparing for the Biosafety 
Protocol, the UNEP has developed “Technical Guidelines for Biosafety” and 
has worked with up to 130 countries, including China and Argentina, to develop 
National Biosafety Frameworks. Several other international institutions, including 
FAO, WHO and the CGIAR alliance, have been involved in providing advice on 
biosafety assessment approaches. Advice and capacity building activities are also 
frequently undertaken on a bilateral basis. Regulatory agencies and institutions in 
countries such as the USA, Canada and the UK that have relatively long-established 
regulatory agencies and that have interests in harmonizing GM controls run various 
meetings, workshops and exchanges.
With a diversity of international and national organisations engaged in capacity 
building, different kinds of interests, regulatory approaches and models of biosafety 
regulation are being promoted (Gupta and Falkner 2006). There are, however, few 
empirical studies that explore the way capacity building exercises have actually 
influenced national frameworks, decision-making criteria and policies. One exception 
is a study that has explored the impact of the Biosafety Protocol in Mexico, China 
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and South Africa on national biotechnology policy, although only in general terms. 
It suggested that there was little influence on domestic biosafety policy as a result
of associated capacity building projects, and that the Biosafety Protocol process 
remained at the margins of political debates around biotechnology (Gupta and 
Falkner 2006). However, it is not clear the extent to which the impact of the Biosafety 
Protocol on regulatory processes was examined, as opposed to its impact on broader 
political and policy debates. Elsewhere, however, it is clear, from a reading of 
regulatory documents that the regulatory approaches established by at least some 
developing countries seem to closely mirror those originally developed within 
international institutions (Scoones 2002; van Zwanenberg 2006). It is unclear then 
what the impact of agreements such as the Biosafety Protocol on the approaches 
to regulation established in signatory countries may be, beyond nudging regulatory 
regimes into compliance with the formal obligations as set out in those agreements. 
 
Recent work examining the scope and effectiveness of international capacity 
building initiatives in biosafety regulation has noted that international efforts have 
focussed on improving scientific risk assessment capacity whilst neglecting other 
important factors prolonging “the biotech divide”, such as transfer of non-proprietary 
technologies focused on locally defined priority crops, South-South collaboration, 
networks of experts, exchange mechanisms for information and experience and 
development of endogenous capacities (Johnston et al 2008).
It is an open question as to whether the kinds of seemingly technical transgenic 
seed registration procedures advanced by these harmonising activities will reflect 
developing country priorities and interests. For example, for some developing 
countries the most important impacts, as far as the commercialisation of GMOs is 
concerned, may be those to do with effects on food security and/or rural employment 
and livelihoods. Biosafety concerns may be comparatively less important, but in 
developed countries those priorities may be reversed, and thus issues of food 
security and employment may be crowded out of international regulatory agendas 
for GMOs. These choices are inevitably a reflection of the social, economic and 
environmental priorities and concerns of industrialised countries, and the particular 
interests that are powerful within those countries. But they do not necessarily 
correspond to the priorities and interests that developing countries might 
wish to promote.
DRUG REGISTRATION
Regulations governing the commercial registration of drugs generally focus on 
ensuring that a drug meets acceptable standards of efficacy, quality and safety. 
Controls on drug manufacturing processes and of the actors and components in 
pharmaceutical supply chains are covered in a subsequent section. Registration 
requirements, at least in developed economies, began in the mid twentieth century 
with standards concerned with controlling adulteration and unsubstantiated 
therapeutic claims, and from the 1960s onwards, with efficacy and safety.
Most developing countries have formal requirements for registering medicine but 
these vary substantially as to what is required and in terms of the resources made 
available for registration. Registration ranges from, at minimum, a simple notification 
scheme, providing centralised information as to whether a particular drug is on 
sale in a country, through to authorisation schemes in which a licence needs to 
be issued before a drug can be lawfully sold but based on registration information 
obtained from other countries. More extensive is full regulatory review, in which, for 
new drugs, evidence for efficacy and safety on the basis of pre-clinical toxicology 
studies and human clinical trials is required from manufacturers prior to registration. 
Given the demands on expertise and time, it is difficult for small regulatory agencies 
to undertake a full regulatory review of new drugs, and many therefore limit 
themselves to a partial review, which basically involves trusting the assessment 
conducted by well resourced agencies such as the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency and the US Food and Drug Administration. The WHO estimates that fewer 
than one in six WHO Member States have well developed drug regulation capacity 
and two in six have no or very little drug regulatory capacity.
Drugs can be classified into three categories, all of which tend to be subject to 
registration requirements: (i) in¬novative, or proprietary, drugs, (ii) similar drugs 
or copies and (iii) generic drugs. Similar drugs or copies are pharmaceutically 
equivalent to the proprie¬tary product — that is, they contain the same active 
ingredients in the same dosage and are intended to be administered by the same 
route. They may not, however, be bioequivalent, (i.e. have the same extent and 
rate of absorption), for example because they have a different excipient or shelf-
life. True generic drugs are both pharmaceutically equivalent and bioequivalent; 
they are entirely interchangeable with the proprietary drug. For new generic drugs 
or for similar drugs, the data required is largely about the pharmaceutical chemistry 
of the product, to allow a comparison with the innovative drug.
Harmonisation efforts, as far as drug registration is concerned, have been driven 
in part by increasing trade in pharmaceuticals but in particular because the 
pharmaceutical industry would like to bring new drugs to market faster, in a wider 
market, and at a reduced cost. The focus of international harmonization efforts to 
date has been led by the pharmaceutical industry and regulators in the European 
Union, Japan and the USA (which together account for 75% of the world’s production 
of medicines, 90% of global pharmaceutical research and development and 90% 
of the worldwide market for drugs). Since 1990, a process of harmonization of 
drug registration known as the International Conference on Harmonisation of 
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, or 
ICH, has began the task of harmonising the testing procedures required to register 
new medicines. 
Although currently focused on harmonisation between Europe, Japan and the USA, 
Abraham and Reed (2001) note that some in industry regard the ICH as the first step 
towards global harmonisation and the production of a global registration dossier, 
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which would contain all the data necessary for marketing approval in any country3. 
They note that it has been suggested by some senior officials that new drugs 
approved by the USA, Japan and EU might simply be approved administratively by 
developing countries without any additional data review by their governments.
Furthermore, as a WHO report notes, many developing countries may adopt ICH 
standards domestically as a means of retaining access to global pharmaceutical 
markets: “ICH has never claimed, and does not have international authority or 
capacity, to produce global standards. Nevertheless, although ICH countries import 
large quantities of pharmaceuticals from non-ICH countries with weak regulatory 
systems, many countries are led to think that adoption of guidelines is a necessary 
move to gain access to the pharmaceutical markets of ICH countries” (WHO 2001).
Inevitably, the ICH process’s view of the drug registration problem corresponds 
to developed countries’ views of the pharmaceutical world, and the content of 
the harmonised guidance largely reflects US, European and Japanese industrial 
concerns. Seemingly technical issues may involve quite important policy choices. 
For example, a report for Médecins Sans Frontières notes that methodological 
choices by the ICH process to assess the efficacy of a new product on the basis of 
superiority to a placebo rather than choosing an active comparator will only show 
that a new drug works, not that it works better than existing therapies. They will 
therefore promote pseudo-innovative medicines - product innovations as opposed 
to purely therapeutic innovations (Abraham 2006). As Médecins Sans Frontières 
put it “[w]hile some ICH countries can afford this irrational approach, this is not the 
case for all non-ICH countries, as they cannot offset such additional health costs” 
(Trouiller et al 2002).
Harmonized standards may presume a degree of universality that does not apply 
in practice, in that there may be a warrant for country-specific requirements for 
particular types of pharmacokinetic or clinical safety studies. The pattern of clinical 
practice varies from country to country and so what may be a reasonable indication 
(i.e. a reason for prescribing a particular drug or treatment) for a product based on 
the data in one country may not fit with the style of clinical practice in another. 
REGULATION OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN
The supply chains for transgenic seeds and drugs include manufacturers, 
importers, distributors, vendors and users/consumers. Aspects of these regulations, 
particularly those subject to globalising pressures, are briefly discussed below.
3 In addition to the ICH process there are various regional harmonisation initiatives, such as 
within the Mercado Común del Sur, or MERCOSUR, which covers Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Paraguay, and the Pan American Network on Drug Regulatory Harmonization. The second 
conference for the latter noted that harmonization should encompass regulations governing not 
only the registration of drugs but their marketing as well.
TRANSGENIC SEEDS
Regulations governing the supply chain for transgenic seeds cover licensing of seed 
companies, distributors, and dealers and in some cases, controls on farmers’ use 
of seed. Most controls on farmers use of seed is either very tangential (i.e. via the 
regulation of how herbicides or insecticides should be applied), a consequence of 
‘soft regulation’ (i.e. via the provision of advice from agricultural extension services) 
or essentially private regulation (i.e. terms of use in the contract with suppliers). The 
latter takes the form, typically, of purchase agreements which, in some jurisdictions, 
private seed companies have begun setting up directly with farmers. These originated 
in the USA and are often designed to restrict farmer practices of saving seed or 
of selling saved seed, without having to rely on plant variety protection legislation. 
Indeed they often have a far wider scope than restrictions ensuing from plant variety 
protection. In some countries these enable the company to use breach of contract 
claims in local courts to enforce ownership of seeds (Van Wijk 1996). Similar 
purchase agreements have been used, again in the USA, to ensure compliance 
with legally-mandated resistance management strategies for Bt crops (Ely 2006).
DRUGS
Regulations governing the supply chain for drugs cover issues such as good 
manufacturing practice - a system for ensuring that products are consistently 
produced and controlled according to quality standards - the right to prescribe 
drugs, the right to sell drugs, and controls on promotion and marketing. 
One significant globalising influence on supply chain regulation is concerned with 
the WHO’s Essential Drug Policies. These were intended to guide drug selection, 
registration and procurement by governments and they also recommended the 
implementation of policies to promote the use of generic drugs. The purpose was 
to make essential drugs and vaccines available under favourable conditions to 
governments of developing countries. WHO listed around 200 drugs and vaccines 
that were considered to be safe, effective and affordable. Most of these were no longer 
protected by patent rights, and were available at low cost in the form of generics.
Van de Geest notes that the implementation of the programme proved difficult: 
“Pharmaceutical companies that saw their most lucrative products suddenly excluded 
from the market lobbied among political authorities and medical professionals to keep 
their products on the list. Ministries of Health trying to satisfy the medical profession 
and the industry, and keeping their own interests in mind, were slow to implement 
the programme or only paid lip service to it. Pharmacists resisted because it meant 
throwing out their stock of the more expensive medicines. Moreover, both doctors 
and pharmacists believed that some of the new, ‘non-essential’ drugs were superior 
to those on the WHO list and protested against the interference in their professional 
work. Finally, and quite ironically, the patients, those for whom the program had been 
designed, often felt they were being cheated with inferior or second hand medicines” 
(Van de Geest 2006, p. 306).
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Reynolds Whyte et al have noted that an evaluation of the WHO programme 
showed that health planners have a blind spot for drug use outside the channels of 
health care that fall under their mandate. They assume that people use public health 
centres and that they take medicines on prescription (Reynolds Whyte et al 2002). 
As Van de Geest (2006, p. 306) notes: “In most cases where local governments 
did implement [the essential drugs policy] it only affected the public sector, allowing 
private institutions to continue prescribing and dispensing ‘non-essential’ drugs. 
What exactly happened on the ground, however, no one really knows for it was 
rarely documented.” 
The WHO is also involved in other harmonising activities concerning the regulation 
of the drug supply chain. For example, the WHO has developed and published 
guidelines for the development of measures to combat counterfeit medicines and 
heads an International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce.4 
DISCUSSION
A number of points are worth highlighting about the regulation of drugs and 
transgenic seeds in a globalising context. Most generally, there is a latent tension 
between globalising ‘one size fits all’ regulations and the diverse particularities of 
the conditions, interests, and use contexts within developing countries (Orsi and 
Coriat 2006). This kind of misalignment may arise in several different ways. One 
relatively obvious source of mismatch is where regulatory policies that have been 
developed in Northern settings, and which are then applied elsewhere, reflect 
the particular interests and circumstances of the settings in which they were 
designed. Thus, the internationalisation of intellectual property rights via the TRIPs 
Agreement involves the imposition of obligations that overtly reflect the conditions 
and interests of the pharmaceutical and agricultural and life science sectors in 
the major industrialised countries; in particular, the interests of the dominant firms 
operating in those sectors. There is, however, strong evidence, partly discussed 
above, that the obligations set out in the TRIPs Agreement may not always be, 
or even often be, appropriate for the priorities and needs of the industrial sectors 
and populations of developing countries. Indeed, depending on sector, many less 
developed countries’ interests in economic development might be better served 
in the absence of a patent system, or with a very weak IPR system. The relation 
between forms of intellectual property and development remains controversial.
Another example of global/national mismatches concerns the degree of stringency 
insisted upon with respect to transgenic seed biosafety. For example, Scoones notes 
that strict biosafety regulations raise entry barriers to all but MNCs, in turn meaning 
fewer locally adapted crops, on the basis that local firms are better positioned to 
do this than MNCs (cited in Fukuda-Parr 2007, p. 231). Stringent regulation may 
also encourage the informal sector, as Fukada-Parr (2007) notes, with companies 
avoiding official regulatory processes (which may thus give rise to higher biosafety 
risks). The point is not that regulations should or should not be strict, but rather there 
may be consequences of adopting particular levels or forms of stringency that can 
and do vary as between Northern and Southern settings, and yet globalised forms of 
regulation sometimes effectively assume that those consequences will be uniform.
Regulatory policies and approaches developed at a global level or in Northern 
settings may also involve making more implicit assumptions about the nature of 
institutions, markets, and practices that turn out not to apply in some developing 
country contexts. For example, the essential drugs policies pushed by the WHO 
focused on public sector aspects of health systems, perhaps failing to recognise 
just how extensive private markets were in the delivery of pharmaceutical 
products. Similarly, the extension of intellectual property rights to seeds may not 
only be inappropriate given the particular conditions of, and policy objectives 
for, the agricultural sectors in developing countries, but the capacity for effective 
enforcement of those regulations may not exist either.
Many authors, especially those that have been influenced by the field of science and 
technology studies, note that the same broad point - that regulatory harmonisation 
often reflects the conditions and circumstances of a handful of powerful industrialised 
countries and often reproduces the interests of their already globally dominant firms 
- holds true when seemingly technical regulations and regulatory frameworks are 
transferred from Northern to Southern settings. Thus, in the case of environmental 
safety or food safety assessment procedures, as outlined by bodies such as UNDP 
or Codex, what is being transferred are not just technical rules and procedures but 
also a set of values and assumptions about what is important, what kinds of risks 
are acceptable, what biological processes are relevant. 
Levi-Faur makes a similar point, arguing that where harmonising regulations reflect 
a set of problems and solutions that were socially and politically constructed in 
some dominant countries and regions  “[d]emocratic governance is no longer about 
the delegation of authority to elected representatives but a form of second-level 
indirect representative democracy - citizens elect representatives who control 
and supervise ‘experts’ who formulate and administer policies in an autonomous 
fashion from their regulatory bastions” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 13).
There are important caveats to these rather broad-brush points about the 
imposition of Northern country interests and perspectives, via globalising regulatory 
processes, on developing countries. International regulations are often in tension 
with explicit regulatory policies of entirely domestic origin. For example, the WTO 
and Biosafety Protocol Agreements generally stress that it is scientific criteria that 
should determine whether transgenic seeds can be adopted for commercial use 
for domestic production. Yet national priorities for the technology may be overtly or 
covertly linked to socio-economic criteria, which individual jurisdictions adopt when 
making regulatory decisions. For example, in Argentina transgenic seeds are not 4 See http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/en/
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generally approved for commercial use unless their main export markets have also 
approved the seed/foodstuff, but this kind of criterion is probably inconsistent with 
the WTO/Biosafety Protocol Agreements.
Newell (2003) notes that it is too simplistic to assume that developing countries 
always passively adopt global regulations and regulatory designs. International 
agreements are often fairly ambiguous, and there may be multiple, competing 
interests within any one jurisdiction in relation to such agreements. Newell 
describes how domestic policy networks in India and China sought to translate 
policy commitments contained in international agreements on trade and biosafety 
into domestic policy in ways that consolidated their position in the bureaucracy. 
He also argues that each country has enough of a clearly defined national interest 
in biotechnology that international processes are regarded as an opportunity to 
internationalise domestic policy preferences and secure scope for discretion in 
national policy-making. In other words, multi-level regulatory processes provide 
different venues where negotiating attempts can be made to realise domestic 
priorities; although the ability to negotiate may be compromised, especially beyond 
national policy and industrial elites. It is an open question as to how the position 
of poorer communities is reflected in the power relations that affect how national 
states seek to interpret international regulations.
Similar arguments about how the domestication of international obligations 
involves, or could involve, reinterpretation and refashioning of global standards 
to make them compatible with local normative frameworks and the interests of 
local actors is made by van Wijk and Ramanna (2007) about IPR in Indian seed 
markets, and by Gupta and Falkner (2006) about implementation of the Biosafety 
Protocol in Mexico, South Africa and China. Millstone and van Zwanenberg (2003) 
have argued that the requirements in the SPS and Biosafety Protocol Agreements 
in principle allow countries more flexibility than most commentators assume in 
deciding whether they have to conform to the standards set by international bodies 
and powerful trade partners.
Some authors, whilst acknowledging that there are opportunities contained in 
multilateral agreements for relative flexibility, have argued that capacity building 
exercises and other forms of technical assistance may end up diminishing the 
extent to which some developing countries actually exploit those flexibilities. For 
example, Carlos Correa notes, in relation to patents, that most of the technical 
assistance that has gone to developing countries is more concerned with 
compliance with the provisions relating to the rights of the patent holders than the 
application of flexibilities within the multilateral framework to promote and protect 
public health (South Centre 1997). Jansen and Roquas (2005) argue that capacity 
building exercises encourage standardised approaches that have been designed 
by ‘absentee experts’ detached from local contexts, who are brought together for 
short periods to provide guidance on apparently technical issues, imported more 
often than not from other contexts. They note that although translation of such 
frameworks, standards, guidelines etc. into national and local contexts allows 
countries to adapt them to their own needs, in practice many weak states do not 
have the capacity to develop legislation with domestic needs identified and built in. 
However, in all this it is worth remembering that some developing country states 
have little capacity to implement regulatory frameworks no matter what form they 
take, whether imported unaltered or adapted appropriately.
Another point to draw from the literature on seed and drug regulation in a globalising 
context concerns the diversity in the kinds of regulations that are subject to 
processes of harmonisation. Different international obligations may be concerned 
essentially with different kinds of objectives, and their objectives and remits may 
sometimes overlap or conflict with each other. For example, there are unresolved 
tensions between the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the 
Biosafety Protocol. Article 26 of the Biosafety Protocol allows signatories to take 
into account “socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of [GMOs] on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity” in determining whether 
to approve the import of a GMO. The SPS Agreement, on the other hand, does not 
allow for stricter standards on a GMO import than is otherwise deemed scientifically 
necessary to protect human or plant health. Where responsibility for implementing 
the Biosafety Protocol sits in a different Ministry to that of ensuring compliance with 
the SPS Agreement (e.g. an Environment versus an Agricultural Ministry) such 
tensions may come to the fore in domestic politics. To take another example, the 
underlying objectives of the essential drugs policies, promoted by the WHO – that 
of ensuring that drugs and vaccines are available under favourable conditions to 
governments of developing countries – are in tension with the objectives of TRIPs 
Agreement which are concerned primarily with extending intellectual property rights 
both geographically and across a wider range of artefacts.
Two further points are worth making in relation to this body of literature. The first 
is that, in general, the diversity of use contexts within developing countries is 
not addressed, at least to any great extent, in most of the literature pointing to 
the different contexts and interests between Northern and Southern settings in 
situations of globalising regulation. Clearly there are competing constituencies and 
interests within developing countries, and no single set of conditions, priorities, 
values and interests that are relevant to the development of regulatory institutions, 
policies and standards. Indeed, compared to more developed countries there is 
typically greater heterogeneity within a given developing country as to levels of 
income, living conditions, farming practices, health and so on. In countries like 
Argentina or Brazil, for example, large, highly mechanised, commercial farms 
producing commodities for export co-exist with poorly resourced small holders 
where production is primarily for subsistence, and where cultivation relies on 
animal traction or human labour. Given such heterogeneous use contexts, it makes 
little sense to talk about an unambiguous set of national priorities, interests, or 
perspectives regarding a technology and its appropriate forms of regulation. Where 
‘national interests’ are mobilised in international negotiations, then they are more 
likely to be those of the elite power bases within those nations, rather than the 
marginal and poor, except in instances when the two happen to coincide.
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The second more general point is that these general observations and arguments 
about the transfer, under processes of globalisation, of particular regulatory 
assumptions and perspectives from one jurisdiction to another are related to a 
broader analytical issue about the discourses and framing of regulation that has 
been raised and explored within the field of science and technology studies (Levidow 
et al 1997; Brickman et al 1985; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). This issue is not just 
confined to the general definitions of what is considered to be at risk but also extends 
to the seemingly more technical aspects of regulation, such as scientific risk 
assessments. The latter, as several authors have explored, reflect particular social 
and political commitments that could be otherwise. For example, technical 
assessments of risk are often conditional on assumptions about the behaviour of 
human agents and institutions (Wynne 1989). People and organisations may behave 
as assessors expect, or want them to, but such assumptions are by no means a 
foregone conclusion. They are conditional social commitments rather than part 
of what purport to be purely technical claims. These points are not made in the 
context of globalising regulations, but are more really about scientific cultures of 
risk and about making explicit the otherwise unexamined assumptions about the 
social contexts within which potentially risky activities take place, and that therefore 
in part constitute the supposedly technical risks to be regulated. The critique has 
been one of the scientistic tradition in risk analysis (i.e. the view that problems 
of risk are matters for science, and science alone, to resolve), rather than the 
extra variability that arises when regulations are exported from one context to 
another. But the point is key, we feel, and the question that we can ask is, where do 
conditional assumptions about users and their behaviour come from? Unexamined 
scientific cultures prevailing in international negotiation? Or circumstances that 
are examined, but only valid in one context, which is the location in which the 
regulations originated? An important corollary to this is the need to attend to the 
local realities of drug and seed use.
5. INFORMAL USE OF DRUGS AND SEEDS 
This section reviews general literature on the use of drugs and seeds, especially 
informal patterns of use (i.e. that are not mandated by regulations) amongst 
poorer communities. For the purposes of this review we are interested in the 
extent to which actual patterns of use amongst poor communities differ from 
the assumptions and expectations of policymakers, regulators and other actors 
about technological practices. Here we can define informal use not only as some 
of the ways in which final consumers of drugs and seeds learn about, obtain 
and use seeds and drugs, but also some of the ways in which producers and 
distributors make them available to those consumers. National policies and 
other actions on the part of state agencies may sometimes facilitate informal 
patterns of production, trade and use (in the sense that these occur in ways 
that are not mandated by international or national rules). In such cases, state 
practices themselves might be thought of as part of the informal system of use 
of those artefacts.
DRUGS
As recently as 1987, Sjaak van der Geest (1987) noted that there has been hardly 
any field research into the ways drugs are actually used in developing countries. 
That lacuna has begun to be addressed over the last 20 years, especially after 
researchers and policy-makers, concerned with the policy implications of the 
essential drugs programmes that were promoted by the WHO in the 1980s, began 
to document the local realities in which medicines were actually made available 
and used. There are now many studies of medicines sales practices, prescription 
practices, and consumption practices in developing countries. 
Researchers have shown the significance of the commercial and informal channels 
for medicines transactions (van der Geest et al 1996). For example, a valid 
prescription is not a prerequisite for receiving scheduled drugs at pharmacies in 
many developing countries. The literature suggests that up to 80% of all drugs in 
some countries are purchased by people for themselves or for a family member 
without prescription (cited in Homedes & Ugalde 2001). Pharmacists, or untrained 
assistants, ‘prescribe’ medicines themselves, giving advice to customers over 
the counter and acting as doctors  (van der Geest et al 1996). Health workers 
may also distribute and sell pharmaceuticals both within the institutions where 
they work and outside them from their homes and in informal practices (van 
der Geest et al 1996). There are also various informal and untrained vendors of 
medicines: pharmaceuticals are sold in general stores and in markets (van der 
Geest et al 1996).
Researchers have argued that informal medicine sellers are often closer to their 
customers than doctors and pharmacists, geographically, financially, and socially 
(van der Geest et al 1996). Yet the sales practices of informal pharmaceutical 
suppliers are driven more by a logic of commercial exchange than that of the 
delivery of professional services. Hence potentially dangerous practices (in both 
the legal sector as well as in the illegal market) occur. These include the sale of 
loose medication, the sale of prescription medication without requiring the buyer 
to provide a prescription, the sale of only part of a course of medicine when 
customers do have a prescription, the inadequate substitution of prescriptions, 
the lack of advice and information on the use of the products, and employment 
of unqualified staff (Maiga et al 2003). These practices contribute to biomedical 
definitions of inappropriate use of medication, such as inadequate therapeutic 
use, over-consumption of drugs, excessive use of antibiotics and injectables and 
premature discontinuation of treatment (Maiga et al 2003).
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Van der Geest et al note that many authors comment on the difficulty of distinguishing 
between commercial, informal channels and more public, formal distribution 
systems for drugs; the two are in practice tightly intertwined (van der Geest et al 
1996). For example, the development of an informal medicine market is attributed 
to an inability on the part of the public system to make professional health workers 
accessible to the entire population, to cope with drug shortages in state health 
institutions, and to provide adequate wages to health workers so that they try and 
supplement their incomes (van der Geest et al 1996). These failures of the state’s 
policy force people into a self-help culture of medicine and create space for the 
development of an informal medicine market and patterns of use very different to 
those presumed by the pharmaceutical companies developing the medicine.
Many biomedical commentators have criticised the quality of prescribing – in all 
countries not just in developing countries. The most common criticism here is that 
there is over-prescribing - too many medicines, too many varieties, unnecessary 
antibiotics and/or injections, and too expensive medicines. Over-prescribing can 
be the result of poor or biased information disseminated to prescribers, profit 
making, or the fact that it is easier to satisfy patients with drugs than with words 
(van der Geest et al 1996; Homedes & Ugalde 2001). Where medication is seen 
as the essence of medical practice, prescribing is the main thing expected from a 
physician. One concern of over-prescribing is that people tend to imitate doctors’ 
prescriptions in self-medication (van der Geest et al 1996).
Turning to consumption practices, research has emphasised the fact that most 
pharmaceuticals, even regulated prescription-only drugs, are taken as self-medication 
(van der Geest et al 1996). Pharmacists, shop attendants and other informal 
suppliers of medicines obviously can and do foster self-medication by bolstering the 
easy availability of drugs but commentators have also argued that rising levels of 
self-medication in developing countries are associated with decreases in thresholds 
of tolerance for symptoms, greater familiarity with drugs and medicine vendors, 
changing health concerns related to modernisation (e.g. environmental degradation, 
adulteration of food), dramatic increases in the number of products available in the 
marketplace and changes in the purchasing power of consumers (Kamat & Nichter 1998).
Beckerlega et al note that the increasing tendency of people, particularly the poor, to 
equate health care with the consumption of pharmaceutical products is a hallmark 
of the commodification of health. They note that:
[w]here people are unable to exercise control over their physical and social 
environments they tend to suffer ill health as a direct or indirect result. Under such 
circumstances, medicines which can be readily purchased may be attributed almost 
magical properties by those who use them. The use of medicines as a means of 
gaining health takes place within particular social and cultural contexts and such 
drugs are popular in contexts where there is considerable social insecurity and 
where people try to address short term problems. A context where functional health 
(the ability to perform work roles in the short term) increasingly takes precedence 
over long term concerns about well being is a fertile ground for a flourishing trade in 
medical fixes (Beckerlega et al 1999).
Nichter and various co-authors note that the public at once desires the fast relief 
that ‘strong’ allopathic medicines deliver and at the same time fears the potential 
long-term side effects. Consequently, people are less inclined to take long-term 
courses of medicines particularly when symptoms subside. Medicines are often 
not used as intended. Curative drugs are sometimes purchased for preventive and 
promotive health purposes by people who feel at risk of disease, given a particular 
living or work environment, or a state of ill health they fear may develop into a more 
serious illness (cited in Saradamma et al 2000).
Many researchers have also investigated the cultural and symbolic meanings 
of medicines. They have stressed that decisions to prescribe, dispense and use 
medicines take place in cultural contexts where medicines are used for other than 
clinical reasons, and that meaningful changes to those practices cannot take place 
unless this context is understood. For example, patients may have good reasons 
for taking their medicines in a way other than that indicated by a prescriber, and 
conceptions of health, illness, and medicine that differ from bio-medical views may 
affect the way people take medicines (van der Geest et al 1996).
Turning specifically to antibiotics (our case study medicine) many of the points 
above regarding consumption practices are all manifest. Thus, antibiotics are 
commonly purchased for self-medication by customers. Their ability to cure bacterial 
infections has helped to create the image of antibiotics as miracle drugs, an image 
which has contributed to their inappropriate prescription and use (Saradamma et 
al 2000). Saradamma et al (2000) cite several studies showing that self-medication 
of antibiotics means that they are often taken in inadequate doses for too few 
days. For example, one such study noted that only 18% of self-purchasers and 
40% of prescription holders purchased a full course of antibiotics and that 30% of 
self-purchasers acquired only a one-day supply of an antibiotic requested. Self-
medication with antibiotics has led the World Health Organization to call attention 
to the dangers of self-medication as a cause of antibiotic resistance (Kamat 1998). 
The politically acceptable and widely proposed response to this problem is one 
of education, of both healthcare providers and patients alike. The WHO has 
also highlighted the importance of regulations around licensing and prescribing 
drugs, the establishment of essential drugs lists and national standard treatment 
guidelines, and monitoring and surveillance for antibiotic resistance.
Broadening our perspective on informal drug use  - from informal patterns of 
prescription, sale and consumption to informal modes of producing and distributing 
drugs - raises a set of issues that has emerged, especially in recent years, about the 
quality of pharmaceuticals available in both public and private sectors, and in particular 
the problems of counterfeit drug production, smuggling, and distribution/sale. 
Counterfeits can occur with both branded and generic medicines, but expensive 
patented drugs rather than cheap generics are generally the target of counterfeiters 
(Outterson 2004). Counterfeits include products with the correct ingredients but 
fake packaging or the correct ingredients but which are in some other sense 
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‘sub-standard’, for example because they are manufactured by an unlicensed 
source. Such products may be safe and effective but just illegal. The issues 
raised with unlicensed but safe and effective drugs are somewhat different to 
those that occur where counterfeits contain the wrong ingredients, improper 
doses of the active ingredients, sub-potent or super-potent ingredients, no active 
ingredient, or are contaminated. The latter type of counterfeit is unreliable, useless, 
or dangerous. They are a threat to public health, as well as to the established 
pharmaceutical industry.
Estimates of the total number of counterfeit drugs available in different markets 
vary quite widely. The WHO reports estimates ranging from around 1% of all drugs 
in developed countries to between 10% and 30% in developing countries, with 
quite large likely variations within countries, especially between urban and rural 
areas, but the sources of these estimates are not provided (WHO 2006). It is very 
difficult to gauge the reliability of these estimates, or to know what proportion of 
different kinds of counterfeit are included in the definition of ‘counterfeit’. It is very 
likely, however, that there is a significant problem with counterfeit drugs, especially 
in some countries/regions. 
The existence of counterfeits raises general questions about the factors and 
policies that might variously encourage and discourage counterfeiting. For example, 
counterfeiting is only potentially attractive so long as the actual product has a high 
value relative to the cost of manufacturing a plausible placebo. Generics wipe out 
many of the incentives to counterfeit by lowering retail prices down towards the 
cost of production. To take another example, whilst policy measures to combat 
counterfeiting may have the effect of helping to remove potentially dangerous drugs 
from developing country markets they may also or alternatively mean that safe, 
effective, copies of branded drugs are removed too, with negative consequences 
for poor consumers.
TRANSGENIC SEEDS
Most farmers in developing countries save their own seed on¬-farm, or obtain 
seeds through farmer to farmer exchanges, or through an unofficial seed trade 
(this applies to all seed, not only transgenic varieties). Around 80% of the seed 
requirements in developing countries are met in this way (van Wijk 1995). Seed 
saving and farmer to farmer exchange of seed is important for farmers because 
it can considerably reduce seed costs and it makes farmers less dependent on 
external suppliers. Farmer to farmer exchange is often based on traditional social 
alliances and family relations (Badstue et al 2007). Farmer saved seed is not 
exclusively a developing country phenomenon. In 2005 the International Seed 
Federation produced estimates from 18 mostly developed countries in which 
typically 20–40% of the seed requirements were met by farm-saved seed, but for 
some crops and countries they were much higher (Grain 2007b).
Unofficial seed trade sometimes takes the form of grain for seed exchanges with 
dealers or grain elevators. Grain/seed swaps involve a credit system in kind: the 
farmer receives a bag of seed from a dealer during planting time. This seed is 
actually conditioned grain that has been produced by other farmers. In return, the 
farmer hands over a double or triple quantity of grain to the dealer during harvest 
time. For the farmer, this transaction has advantages of lower seed prices and 
avoidance of cash payment. Payment in kind makes farmers less vulnerable to 
inflation and lessens the pressure to market their produce. The benefit for the dealer 
is that they can get two or three bags of grain for the price of one, and that it is an 
unofficial transaction: both royalty and tax payment can be avoided (van Wijk, 1995).
For transgenic seeds, the unofficial trade in developing countries has not just 
constituted farmers saving GM seed varieties and selling them on to dealers or 
other farmers, but also one of a proliferation of clandestine seed breeding, i.e. 
seeds from suppliers who have not licensed the products from the original seed 
producers and whose products are not certified as the varieties that have been 
officially released. Keshav Raj Kranthi, a scientist at the Central Institute of Cotton 
Research based in Nagpur, pointed out in 2006 that there were many spurious 
cotton varieties labelled Bt cotton, as well as unauthorised companies selling Bt 
cotton in India. He said there were four kinds of Bt cotton in India: “Legal, illegal, 
fake legal and fake illegal.” (SciDev 2006). Kranthi noted that amongst samples 
tested by CICR, on average, 28% of the illegal seed brands are non-Bt, only 26% 
of the Bt cotton was true first-generation hybrid, while 46% was contaminated with 
non-Bt cotton.
Also in India it was discovered in 2001 that Bt cotton had been grown in Gujarat and 
many other states for some years prior to authorisation, having been supplied by 
the company Navbharat Seeds without government approval. This occurred whilst 
regulators were going through the politically difficult process of deciding upon the 
fate of an application by a joint venture between Monsanto and a local company, 
Mayhco, to commercialise Monsanto’s Bt cotton variety. As Scoones (2003, p. 9) 
put it: “A section of the vast, largely unregulated network of seed bulking, supply and 
distribution outfits had made good use of an apparently good new product and, to 
the delight of many farmers, had sold it at a reasonable, if slightly marked up, price. 
While the regulators were deliberating in Delhi, the farmers of the cotton belt were 
reaping the benefits of Bt cotton across large areas.” He adds: “As the ‘transgenic 
chaos’ in Gujarat – repeated elsewhere, although less dramatically – has shown, 
informal markets, astute entrepreneurs and farmers demanding effective products 
combine to undermine any neat, regulatory system imposed from elsewhere.” 
(Scoones 2003; p. 41).
The scale on which transgenic seed use at a global level has relied either on 
farmers saving their own seed or from uncertified sources (whether from farmers 
and seed dealers selling farmer saved seed, or as a result of uncertified seed 
multiplication and/or clandestine plant breeding activities) is really quite extensive. 
Trigo et al note that as measured by area of adoption, herbicide tolerant soybeans 
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in Argentina and Bt cotton in China have been the industries’ two greatest GMO 
successes. But GMO developers have not been able to capture revenue from even 
half the planted area in either case because of seed piracy (Trigo et al 2000).
As well as commentaries on the sources of transgenic seeds, there is attention in 
the literature to how farmers, especially poorer farmers, obtain information about 
transgenic seeds and why they choose to plant them. This relates to a much 
broader and longer standing literature on seed diffusion amongst small farmers 
which, in general terms, points to farmers’ complex production environment, and 
their lack of access to adequate information (Tripp 2001).
Drawing on knowledge about farmer adoption of Green Revolution seed varieties, 
Tripp argues that many transgenic seeds feature qualities that may not be obvious 
to many farmers, and that this raises a series of questions about the information 
requirements that would allow farmers to develop experience about transgenic 
varieties and to make informed choices (Tripp 2001). The characteristics of a seed 
variety cannot usually be recognised by the farmer prior to purchase. Instead farmers 
can only appreciate the qualities of a seed variety during and after it has been grown, 
but even then they must judge performance under their specific growing conditions. 
For transgenic seeds the characteristics of the seed may not be immediately 
obvious. This means that farmers have to take it on faith that the seed will, for 
example, be resistant to a stress condition that appears infrequently (Tripp 2001).
Tripp also notes that the delivery of new seeds requires functioning input and 
output markets that stimulate demand for the seed as well as effective intellectual 
property rights. Where these conditions are less likely to be met, private seed 
industry activity is less feasible and the delivery of new varieties more problematic 
(Tripp 2001). He notes, for example, that the potential of transgenic virus-resistant 
potatoes in Mexico showed positive returns for smallholders but that the analysis 
assumed that a seed potato market exists that serves those farmers. In practice 
Mexican farmers do not use commercial seed potato for reasons that include the 
high cost of the seed, the location of the seed industry close to the areas where 
there are big farms, and smallholders lack of familiarity with the advantages and 
management of certified seed (Tripp 2001).
Glenn Davis Stone reported on an ethnographic study of cotton farmers in a district 
in Andhra Pradesh, India in which Bt cotton was rapidly taken up by farmers (Davis 
Stone 2007). He argued that farmer experimentation and evaluation play a much 
smaller part in seed choices than innovation-diffusion theorists and seed companies 
would have us believe. He argues that there has been a process of agricultural 
deskilling, in which the link between environmental learning (about performance, 
in agro-ecological terms, of a seed) and social learning (about, for example, who 
is using new seeds) is disrupted, with only the latter taking place. The failure to 
evaluate and experiment with seeds arises because of the unpredictability of key 
variables in cotton cultivation, such as climate, insect pests in any given year, crop 
yield, and seed quality. The unpredictability of seed quality, Stone notes, increases 
with purchasing of marketed seed compared to farm-saved seed. He notes that there 
are over 800 input shops in the district and 125 cotton brands from 61 companies in 
the 37 vendors in the main city. There are fakes, deceptive labelling, and problems 
of quality control with the seeds, and apparently different seeds that are identical.
Similarly, Devparna et al (2007) note that a study of Gujarati cotton farmers shows 
that unreliable seeds and adulteration plague Indian cotton farmers. They note 
there is often a shortage of certified seed and that this necessitates seed trading 
with fellow farmers and with unauthorised seed traders. They note that farmers are 
continuously trying new varieties of cotton and are wary of dependence on a single 
variety, even if one of these has a reputation for high yields. Rather the dominant 
strategy is continual experimentation and mixing of varieties. 
In commentary on the Stone article, Busch notes that the standards for germination, 
purity and variety that characterise the European and North American seed markets 
are poorly enforced in India with the result that the technology’s identity is itself 
in question (Davis Stone 2007). Scoones, in another commentary, emphasises 
that the reform of the seed market, with complex licensing deals, and illegal pirate 
arrangements, hugely complicates the ways in which farmers have to deal with 
uncertainty in decisions about technology choice (Davis Stone, 2007). Farmers are 
thus faced not only with environmental and agronomic uncertainties, but also market 
uncertainties. Of course, any attempt to regulate these local market issues will have 
to do so in the context of broader national and international regulatory frameworks 
and standards. More pertinently, even where those standards can contribute to 
local market regulation, there are big questions concerning the capacity of local 
regulators to monitor and enforce them in a very dynamic, informal market setting.
DISCUSSION
A number of points are worth highlighting in regard to the literature on informal 
seed and drug use. First, in both the drugs and seeds sectors, assumptions and 
expectations about the nature of supply markets may be at odds with informal 
realities. In the medicines sector, commercial markets are probably more 
widespread and certainly less well regulated than policy-makers perhaps assume 
or certainly wish for. These informal medicine markets, operating outside of formal 
regulatory control, occur not only in the supply of drugs, but in some locations in their 
manufacture and distribution too. In the seeds sector, seed delivery markets to poor 
farmers may be both less prevalent, or function less well, than some policy-makers 
might wish for. Where seed input markets do operate, they often, as in the drugs 
sector, operate as clandestine markets, necessarily outside of regulatory oversight. 
Informal practices are not confined to the existence or absence and functioning of 
markets however. Practices desired by regulators, such as the medical supervision 
of drug prescription, may be absent on the ground. Clearly, many people self-
prescribe, or obtain advice on drug use from non-medical sources. 
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Informal practices are not necessarily confined to poor communities, or to developing 
countries, but they appear to be more prevalent in some less developed countries 
and amongst poorer farmers and consumers in those countries, although this is 
likely to vary depending on the artefact, country and practice. For example, in some 
countries large commercial farmers appear to be just as likely to sell and purchase 
black-market seeds as smaller farmers, whereas informal medicines vendors are 
more likely to supply drugs to poorer, rural communities in some countries than 
wealthy urban citizens. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that poorer farmers and poorer consumers are more likely 
than their wealthier counterparts to be subject to, and to participate in, informal 
practices (in the sense of practices that are not mandated by regulatory controls). 
Yet, poorer users want assurances too that technologies are beneficial and not 
unduly risky. If regulatory systems are primarily operating in ways that serve 
wealthier actors we need to ask whether poorer users would like a regulatory 
system geared to their needs. Hence, in the Rethinking Regulation project 
we shall adopt a backward mapping methodology that begins with the realities 
of artefact use amongst poorer users, asking how those users experience the 
technology and would like to experience it. Our approach uses that lower level 
experience to interrogate regulatory framings and practices at successively 
higher levels.
Returning to the existing literature, in general, the diversity of use patterns, as 
between richer and poorer farmers and consumers or between urban and rural 
dwellers, for example, is not an issue that a great deal of attention is paid to in the 
literature. We know something about how particular groups of people might use 
seeds and drugs but less about the level of variance within particular jurisdictions. 
Whilst it is difficult to get accurate data – indeed, the illicit nature of some informal 
practices renders data gathering highly problematic – the literature nevertheless 
points repeatedly to instances of divergence between regulatory assumptions or 
objectives and informal realities on the ground.
There are several reasons accounting for the prevalence of informal practices 
around seed and drug use. Sometimes, those practices are a reflection of the 
fact that what is rational or logical for particular groups of people is at odds with 
the rationality operating through regulatory standards and practices. The ways 
in which patients opt to use drugs may reflect different cultural rationalities to 
professionalised bio-medical modes of reasoning, or they may simply be a reflection 
of the economic and social position that poorer people find themselves in, perhaps 
facilitated by weak health institutions. Thus, informal patterns of drug and seed use 
may be the best means poor farmers and citizens have of getting by, whether these 
involve obtaining seeds without payment of cash or need for credit, or the taking of 
certain drugs for prophylactic reasons, so as to try and avoid the risk of ill health, 
or in inadequate length of time, so as to avoid high costs. In other cases, informal 
practices may simply be an opportunity to make money that, in the absence of 
effective regulation, offers rewards for relatively little risk. 
Informal patterns of seed and drug use also have different kinds of implications, 
depending on which artefact, practice and setting one is looking at. There are often 
many different kinds of benefits and risks associated with informal use, as compared 
to formal practices, and these are usually distributed unevenly amongst different 
groups and interests. Given the range of consequences of informal seed and drug 
use, as well as the variety of reasons  as to why informal practices are sustained, 
and the different points in production, distribution and use in which informal practices 
occur, there are unlikely to be many simple, universal, or unambiguously desirable, 
‘fixes’. Effective policy intervention, or rather changes to regulatory practice, will 
require an adequate understanding of such practices, their consequences, both 
beneficial and adverse, and of how and why such practices prevail.
Appreciating informal use patterns also raises the issue of the extent to which 
formal regulatory control can in fact be imposed on behaviour. Perhaps seeds and 
drugs are far less governable than we would like to believe? How then might we 
respond when thinking about more appropriate regulatory intervention; and for 
which purposes? Are there alternative ways that involve living to some extent at 
least with the fact that peoples’ behaviour around artefact use cannot always be 
brought into line with policy-makers expectations? 
6. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RETHINKING 
REGULATION PROJECT 
In this final section we briefly summarise the evidence that we have collated in 
this review on how harmonising forms of technology regulation (notably intellectual 
property, technology licensing and regulation of the supply chain) are being 
(re)interpreted across scales and in different contexts, and how they affect, and 
contrast with, the ways seed and drug technologies are experienced by poorer 
communities in developing countries. We do this by reference to the core STEPS 
Centre themes of scales, dynamics, framings, and pathways. We want to identify 
areas of research that are less well covered than others, and issues and questions 
that emerge from our reading of the literature that might be further pursued in the 
Rethinking Regulation project.
SCALES
The first point to make by way of empirical summary is that although the literature 
frequently points to how globalising regulations may, in principle, have a wide range 
of impacts on the ways in which seed and drug technologies are experienced by 
poorer communities (as both technologies and their regulation become globally 
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available and applicable), there is only patchy empirical evidence documenting 
these impacts. How do regulations get interpreted and reinterpreted as they move 
between scales and across contexts? What is the actual impact of global rules in 
particular settings on local technological practices? What sorts of mismatches, if 
any, are there between global expectations and local realities?
The literature summarised here suggests that regulations are not necessarily 
adopted passively by national governments. Instead, as the case studies included 
in this document indicate, they may be reinterpreted and unevenly implemented. 
This is one reason why the question is not only one of how globalising regulations 
have sometimes brought national and local practices into line with global regulatory 
intentions (with all the potential tensions and effects that then arise), but also 
of how global regulations have not necessarily had their desired effects. Yet 
we often don’t know, at least from English language sources, how in particular 
countries international rules have been interpreted, and especially how national 
implementation takes place, and how the position of poorer communities is affected 
by patterns of regulatory implementation. A scrutiny of legislative changes by 
national governments is not sufficient because it is not always clear how far national 
practices align themselves to international rules or just appear to be doing so. If 
we shift to consider how local level regulators have interpreted and implemented 
the regulatory mandates handed down to them from national legislators, then the 
general literature on implementation of global regulation makes little reference to 
local, as opposed to national, level interpretation and implementation. 
What about the ways globalising forms of seed and drug regulation have affected 
how poorer communities have actually experienced seed and drug technologies? 
Domestic production of seeds and drugs is in principle constrained by harmonising 
regulations (intellectual property rules in particular) but little in the literature 
summarised here has analysed how, in practice, domestic drug and seed firms have 
responded to global regulations (once refracted through national governments and 
local regulators). Production activities and firm behaviours have not necessarily 
conformed to international rules. Thus, uncertified production of seeds and drugs, 
essentially counterfeiting, though not necessarily of ineffective artefacts, clearly 
occurs in many settings, although there is little reliable information on the scale of 
these practices (and they appear to be quite extensive in some settings), or on the 
nature of the production and distribution networks that sustain them. The literature 
also highlights how intellectual property protection, and associated increases in 
seed and drug costs, have affected access to seeds and drugs (and how national 
governments, especially in relation to key drugs, have responded) but there is little 
commentary on how the kinds of seeds and drugs that are produced and made 
available may have changed in response to intellectual property and licensing/
trade rules. 
In many countries both seeds and drugs are purchased or obtained through informal 
markets, in ways that are not mandated by global rules. For example, survey 
evidence in many countries indicates that uncertified seed use is extensive (copies 
of transgenic seeds protected by intellectual property rules and GM seed varieties 
that have not been licensed can be obtained by farmers). There is also a large 
literature on informal use practices in the case of drugs and again this points to how 
people access and use drugs in ways that are often inconsistent with international 
and national regulatory expectations of appropriate or lawful practice. 
Overall, then, the literature suggests that whilst harmonising regulations may 
place quite significant disciplining constraints on technology production and 
use in developing countries, there are many quite marked mismatches between 
international regulatory expectations as to how global rules should impact on the 
ways in which technologies are experienced, and the local realities of artefact 
production, exchange and use in poorer communities. The interesting question is 
therefore as much ‘why have global regulations not had their intended effects?’ 
as it is about which kinds of practices they have altered and disciplined, and with 
what implications. We now move on to consider how that issue - a divergence in 
expectations and realities - has been addressed in the literature by reference to the 
STEPS Centre themes of dynamics, framings and pathways. 
DYNAMICS AND DIVERSITY
As seed and drug regulations move between polities, and as the technological 
artefacts themselves enter into global circulation, the social, political and ecological 
contexts in which those specific technologies are used, and in which specific 
modes of globalised regulation encounter technological practices, become more 
diverse. Yet, whilst that increase in diversity of contexts may be true for a specific 
technology or from the perspective of a single mode of regulation, this does not 
equate with increasing socio-ecological, technological or regulatory diversity per 
se. Indeed, it may be at the expense of diversity in other types of technology or 
modes of regulation. We cannot therefore speak so easily of diversity in unqualified 
aggregate terms.
Much of the literature on globalising regulation, summarised here, highlights 
an increased diversity of socio-technical-ecological contexts, relative to the 
homogeneity of regulatory intentions. Thus the literature on globalising intellectual 
property rights in both the seeds and medicines sectors points to the different 
contexts, interests and institutional and financial capacities in many developing 
countries, as compared to industrialised countries, as regards the granting and 
enforcement of patent protection (such as the absence of innovative firms or 
even the absence of a drug manufacturing industry, the inability of social transfer 
systems to pay for universal access to patented medicines, the importance of 
farmer-saved seed in rural livelihoods and the existence of informal credit systems 
in seed provision). The literature on global seed and drug licensing and trade rules 
also notes the diversity of agricultural policy priorities across countries, the diversity 
of available resources for regulatory assessment, the range of different physical 
environments into which transgenic seeds might be introduced, the greater scope 
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for informal seed production to step in and circumvent official regulations in some 
settings, and the relative significance of informal means and channels for drug 
production and distribution. 
In pointing to this diversity of contexts, from the point of view of homogenous 
regulatory systems, as technologies circulate at a global scale, the focus in much 
of the literature is on two sets of issues. One is on the implications of those different 
contexts and conditions for the interests and priorities of developing countries in 
domestic agricultural production and health provision, whether or not these interests 
and priorities are actually exercised in global negotiations and in the ways global 
agreements are interpreted and implemented. The second is on whether or not 
regulation can adequately manage seed and drug technologies given an important 
aspect of those local contexts and conditions; namely, the relatively weak scientific, 
legal, policy, monitoring and enforcement capacity in many countries. 
These two different foci give rise to two kinds of explanation for why global regulations 
have not always had their intended effects. One is essentially that it is not in many 
developing countries’ domestic political and economic interests to implement and 
enforce global regulations in the ways envisaged by international rules. The other 
is that there is inadequate capacity for regulatory implementation. In the latter 
case, the emphasis, at least in the official literature, is thus on providing support for 
institutional, financial and scientific resources to help regulators fulfil their mandates 
and bring the world into line with the regulatory designs handed down to them.
Somewhat less explicit emphasis in the literature is placed on how the very diversity 
of contexts and conditions can increase uncertainties over the performance and 
effects of seed and drug technologies. In other words, as sources of (often informal) 
production, modes of access, and contexts of use proliferate, from the point of 
view of globalised regulatory systems, there may be extra difficulties for regulatory 
control whatever the scientific and administrative capacity. The nature of contexts 
and conditions in some settings may just mean that certain regulatory designs are 
inherently harder to implement. 
The literature does touch on this issue; for example, attention is drawn to how the 
sources of seed and drug production that are officially attended to in harmonizing 
regulatory ambitions have become more diverse (from the perspective of that 
homogenous regulatory system), with many entrepreneurs able to operate with 
relative ease outside of regulatory control producing unregistered seed varieties or 
in some settings, counterfeit medicines. In the latter case, the regulatory difficulties 
associated with controlling counterfeit medicines have been explicitly discussed, 
especially because they have potentially serious consequences (and reach well 
beyond local or even national boundaries). 
Yet, on other issues, the literature is less explicit at detailing how the increased 
diversity of contexts and conditions encountered by globalised regulatory systems, 
especially in poorer communities, gives rise to informal systems of production, 
exchange and use, with corresponding problems for regulation. What, for example, 
might informal practices around the exchange and sale of insect resistant seeds 
imply for the ability to enforce rules on managing resistance, or for meeting 
importing country requirements, such as segregation of GM and non GM crops? 
What do informal antibiotic use patterns imply for regulatory controls designed to 
maximise drug efficacy, or to minimise the development of disease resistance? 
Such questions push us to consider how well regulators at different levels conceive 
of, or ‘frame’, the practices that they try to control.
FRAMINGS
By framings we are referring here to different actors’ views, judgements and 
assumptions about, and representations of, the object and problematic of regulation 
(Goffman 1974). The notion of framings attempts to combine deliberately formed 
views, for example, as reflected in specific policy goals and actors’ preferences, with 
a more tacit set of assumptions which may reflect taken-for-granted institutional or 
cultural commitments and routines as much as consciously formed choices. As our 
definition suggests there are two aspects of regulatory framing here and it is important 
to distinguish between them. First are views and assumptions about what it is that is 
potentially problematic about a technology and requires regulatory control (as well 
as what appropriate solutions might look like). Such framings include judgements 
and assumptions concerning nominally technical aspects of regulation, such as 
the kinds of risks and patterns of causation considered important or significant. 
The second aspect of regulatory framing, and arguably prior to the first, are framings 
of the object of regulation. In particular, how is the socio-technical-ecological system 
understood - the linked social, technical and natural aspects of the production, 
exchange and use of technological artefacts - that regulation aims to intervene in, and 
which gives rise to particular regulatory problems? Which actors, institutions, networks 
and relationships comprise seed and drug socio-technical-ecological systems, 
and how might these be understood in different ways by different actors in different 
contexts? What are the main functions of that socio-technical-ecological system, 
and how might those particular social, economic or ecological functions or services 
be understood by different actors? How do these different framings characterise 
systems dynamics, and what aspirations and vulnerabilities do they highlight? Clearly, 
competing framings of the object of regulation are likely to imply competing framings of 
the problem that regulations are supposed to address (and the appropriate solutions).
We can expect framings of the object of, and problem for, regulation to vary 
between different actors, especially across institutions and scales. A large body 
of work on technology regulation, much of it focused only on Northern countries, 
has documented competing framings, as between different countries’ regulatory 
systems and as between scientists, policy-makers and citizens. The question 
here however is what do we know empirically about how the socio-technological 
systems of seed and drug provision and use, and the regulatory problems those 
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systems give rise to, are framed by regulators in global institutions, and regulators 
at national and provincial level? In addition, how do these framings compare to 
the realities that are implicit in the experiences and concerns of poorer users of 
technology at local levels in developing countries?
One kind of possible contrast is between framings of regulatory objects/problems 
explicit or implicit in international regulations, and in developing countries’ national 
and provincial regulatory systems. The literature summarised here provides some 
indications, and many hints, of competing framings. For example, in the seeds 
sector, competing views between countries, as to the problem that regulation should 
control (e.g. social or technical impacts), were made explicit in the negotiations 
leading up to the signing of the Biosafety Protocol (Stabinsky 2000). In the drugs 
sector, the literature notes how international regulators within the WHO involved 
in constructing Essential Drugs Policies may have assumed that the object of 
regulation was the public sector, thus overlooking the significance of private and 
more informal drug provision systems in developing countries. Otherwise, the 
evidence really consists of the occasional observation. For example, in Argentina, 
the regulatory problem, as far as granting licenses to GM crops are concerned, 
is partly one of ensuring that there are adequate export markets available, but 
that issue falls outside the problem definitions implicit in the licensing procedures 
advocated in, or constrained by, the Biosafety Protocol and WTO Agreements. 
A second contrast is between framings of regulatory objects/problems held by 
international, national or provincial regulatory bodies and those implicit in the actual 
experiences and concerns of poorer technology users. The literature summarised 
here provides almost no commentary on those framings. One exception is from the 
drugs sector where the literature suggests that international regulators within the 
WHO failed to recognise that drug purchasers and users in developing countries 
often did not take medicines on prescription nor obtain them through formal 
channels; nor did they necessarily understand that branded international medicines 
were sometimes assumed by local users to be superior to generic equivalents.
Overall then, the literature reviewed here on seeds and drugs has rarely documented 
explicitly the extent to which there might be similar or competing framings between 
various kinds of actors and across various levels. This is especially so in terms of 
competing framings of the object of regulation: those aspects of the socio-technical 
system of seed and drug use that are within and outside the regulatory frame. It is 
also especially so in terms of how poorer users frame regulatory objects/problems. 
Those poorer user framings are partly a reflection of those components of the 
seed and drug socio-technical systems that impinge on how poorer users actually 
experience a technology, and partly a reflection of what poorer users themselves 
are concerned about in respect of that system.  
The absence of explicit attention to how framing of regulatory objects/problems 
compare, both amongst regulators at different scales and between regulators and 
poorer users, is a gap in the literature that we feel deserves to be filled. It may be 
extremely helpful in shedding light on why regulatory objectives sought by policy-
makers in Rome, Geneva, and Washington, and in Beijing and Buenos Aires, fail 
to materialise in the realities of seed and drug regulation and use in particular 
localities in China or Argentina.
PATHWAYS
Socio-technological-ecological systems are not static. Rather, interacting social, 
technological and ecological systems co-evolve over time, in particular directions 
(with framings, discussed above, constituting the epistemic dimension of such 
pathways). Multiple, self-reinforcing mechanisms are involved in that process of co-
evolution resulting in specific pathways of change which typically display properties 
of lock-in, momentum and path-dependency. 
Regulations are arguably one of the mechanisms that contribute to the processes 
which set and maintain particular pathways. Indeed, as highlighted at the beginning 
of this paper, regulatory assurances are an important aspect of the technology 
development process, helping to shape investment decisions, product development, 
markets and the nature and distribution of risks and benefits. Indeed, this is partly 
why political disputes over the design and functioning of regulatory regimes can be 
so heated: regulatory regimes contribute to reinforcing or hindering the unfolding of 
particular kinds of socio-technical-ecological pathways.
The literature on globalising regulation certainly recognises this key function 
of regulation. It forms the backdrop against which international and national 
regulatory priorities sometimes diverge, as, for example, national governments 
seek to interpret and selectively implement global regulations in ways that promote 
domestic preferences as to desired pathways of socio-technical change. In the 
field of agricultural biotechnology, for example, the desirability or otherwise of 
transgenic agriculture in its entirety, as well as the particular crop/trait combinations 
that receive attention and those that do not, are often explicitly the focus of 
regulatory politics. 
Yet, this function played by regulation - of reinforcing or hindering the unfolding 
of particular kinds of socio-technical-ecological pathways – generally exists in the 
literature only as a context for discussing regulatory manoeuvring, rather than a 
central object of research. There is little empirical analysis of potential changes 
in socio-technical practices, and associated pathways of change, as a result of 
particular forms of regulation. What, for example, happens to an existing set of 
socio-technical practices, and associated socio-technical-ecological pathways of 
change in response to processes of globalising regulatory harmonisation? Do some 
practices and pathways disappear? Do new ones emerge? Are some strengthened 
and others weakened? And what might the implications of these changes be for 
Sustainability, as defined and valued by particular communities?
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One contributing factor to the relative neglect of how regulation might influence 
socio-technical-ecological pathways of change is that innovation policies are often 
excluded from definitions of regulation. Instead, attention focuses largely on rule-
making activities for established or emerging technology products and processes, 
especially since it is these that are subject to harmonisation processes, and 
less so on policies for supporting and directing on-going technology innovation. 
As discussed at the beginning of this document, our own working definition of 
technology regulation is ‘attempts by states to shape the broader governance and 
specific uses of technology’, a definition which deliberately includes aspects of 
‘front-end’ innovation policy. Innovation policies and practices are not subject to 
direct harmonisation initiatives but they are affected by them. Changes to intellectual 
property rules, for example, can have profound effects on science, technology and 
innovation policies and practices within a particular jurisdiction.
In exploring the interactions between formal regulation of transgenic cotton 
seeds and antibiotics, and informal practices, we will pay explicit attention to how 
regulations might help set, maintain and/or undermine particular pathways of 
socio-technical-ecological change. Dominant pathways are likely to be associated 
with the framings, interests, and actions of powerful actors, including regulators, 
and with powerful, entrenched disciplinary perspectives or policy discourses. 
Other potential pathways, that perhaps do not, or only barely, exist may emanate 
from the ‘bottom-up’, starting from user practices, concerns and aspirations in all 
their diversity, and in those cases we want to document and explore their status. 
Of particular interest are those pathways that lead to improved outcomes in 
terms of Sustainability.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the many ‘gaps’ discussed above, the literature does suggest that 
harmonisation aspirations may be confounded by a twofold and interacting dynamic. 
The first is the way global regulatory obligations are interpreted and implemented 
at the national (and perhaps also the local) level. The second is the actual practices 
of users of the regulated technologies at the local level. Neither the national or 
local regulatory idea of ‘proper use’, nor the ‘actual use’ of the artefact in poorer 
communities, needs accord with harmonised regulatory expectations for appropriate 
technological practices. Both dynamics are acknowledged in (parts of) the literature 
on seed and drug regulation and use, but, as far as we can tell, they have not 
been investigated jointly. This is a key aim of the Rethinking Regulation project. 
In seeking to investigate these twin dynamics, two broad analytical literatures stand 
out as clearly relevant to the research project. The first is political science insights 
into the transfer and implementation of regulations across different settings and 
levels. This enables us to appreciate that there are limitations on top-down policy 
implementation. Local regulators reinterpret their mandates from above, and in 
important respects policy implementation is constituted by the politics of local-level 
practices. The second body of literature is science and technology studies’ insights 
into how technologies can be understood as hybrid social-technical objects or 
systems, rather than context free physical artefacts (Latour 1993). This perspective 
enables us to appreciate that technologies are flexible: they change as they move 
from one context to another. As the institutional and social arrangements in which 
artefacts are manufactured, exchanged and used alter, so technologies ‘work’ in 
different ways too, and have different kinds of effects and consequences. 
Central to our task of unpacking the twin dynamics of (i) regulatory implementation and 
(ii) the actual practices of users of regulated technologies are notions of how socio-
technical systems and regulatory problems are ‘framed’ by users and regulators. 
As highlighted by the science and technology studies literature, socio-technical 
systems of seed and medicine provision and use will vary across contexts as very 
different kinds of actors in very different kinds of relationships with each other, and 
in different socio-economic and ecological settings, innovate, produce, exchange 
and use technological artefacts in specific ways. This point strongly suggests that 
these systems are likely to be explicitly and implicitly understood, or framed, by 
users, regulators, and legislators in different ways. If so, the important question 
that arises is whether regulatory framings of seed and medicine systems include 
or exclude the practices of poorer communities, and with what consequences. In 
other words do regulatory framings capture and understand, and thus potentially 
intervene in, the realities of how poorer communities experience seed and drug 
artefacts, and do those framings of both seed/drug technological systems and the 
problems they pose reflect the actual concerns of poorer communities? 
We intend to use our comparative analysis of regulatory framings and practices to 
engage critically with regulatory reform and regulatory capacity building initiatives 
that take place as part of broader processes of regulatory harmonization. The 
literature reviewed here suggests that there might be a need to nurture flexibility in 
regulatory approaches, which adapt to local conditions and norms (albeit sensitive 
to the correspondingly greater risks of local capture under prevailing power 
relations). In other words, the classic concerns of regulatory design and regulatory 
implementation, traditionally considered sequentially, need to be considered in the 
round and situated together in specific contexts. Capacity-building, according to 
this view, needs to attend to and support the development of more locally specific, 
inclusive, and collaborative regulatory approaches, able to work with the grain of 
the situation on the ground. We will therefore be asking in our empirical domains 
if there is greater potential for more reflexive regulatory capabilities, for policy-
makers to recognise the effects of regulatory framing and for regulations to become 
more adaptive to diverse, dynamic and uncertain contexts, thus working towards 
regulatory pathways that work for Sustainability.
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